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Abstract
This paper analyzes market capacity expansion in the presence of intertemporal consumption ex-
ternalities such as consumer learning, networks, or bandwagon eects. The externality leads to an
endogenous shift of market demand that responds to past market capacity. Whereas market capacity
grows in waves, its magnitude depends on the degree of market concentration. The competitive en-
vironment contributes to S-shaped time patterns of market capacity expansion that is slow from the
social viewpoint. On the other hand, using an introductory price, a monopolist plans an initially larger,
but eventually smaller, amount of market cultivation than a competitive market capacity expansion.
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1 Introduction
In a number of successful product or services markets, the level of market demand often increases over
time. One of the significant features of this growth is that it is gradual rather than instantaneous. Although
dierent explanations are possible for this gradual expansion, there is an important but relatively neglected
reason in the literature: an intertemporal consumption externality where market demand is endogenously
determined as an increasing function of past market capacity, defined as the number of consumers who
buy the product. Several reasons exist for such an externality. First, there may be consumer learning.
An increase in past market capacity leads to an accumulation of product information among consumers
and to an updating of consumer preferences. Second, indirect network externalities may exist1. The
variety of complementary products is an increasing function of the number of past product users (for
example, computers and software). Another reason, which is purely psychological, is the bandwagon
eect. Consumers often wish to consume a popular product. They may regard past market capacity as a
sign of popularity2.
When an intertemporal consumption externality exists, the market equilibrium contains dynamic as-
pects: market capacity increases in waves. More importantly, market capacity expansion may be highly
dependent on the degree of market concentration. Intuitively, market concentration enables firms to e-
ciently expand the market by internalizing the externality, but also earn a large, socially inecient level of
profits. In contrast, the competitive environment restricts firm profits but makes the internalization of the
externality dicult. It is apparently ambiguous how these dierences aect the level, time pattern, and
product price of the market capacity expansion. The main aim of this paper is to theoretically examine the
relation between market concentration and the properties of the market capacity expansion in the presence
of an intertemporal consumption externality.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of market capacity expansion with endogenous market
demand in an infinite-horizon framework. The market demand increases with increases in the previous
period’s market capacity because of an intertemporal consumption externality. We examine two types of
market capacity expansions: a competitive (decentralized) market capacity expansion and a monopoly
1See Katz and Shapiro (1994).
2This may be naive behavior, but is consistent with the existence of advertising and media reports containing information on
past product sales. See Monterio and Gonzalez (1999) who analyze the role of advertising past sales.
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(centralized) market capacity expansion. In the competitive market, small and identical firms enter the
market responding to each period’s demand growth given the equilibrium price determined by the zero
profit condition. In contrast to competitive firms, a monopolist has the ability to control price. This ability
enables the monopolist to control both the level of current market capacity and future demand growth
because of the internalization of the externality. By increasing current market capacity, the monopolist
generates a large amount of subsequent period demand. However, an increase in current market capacity
reduces current profits. The main dierence between the two market capacity expansions is whether the
intertemporal trade o between current revenue and future demand growth exists or not.
The two market capacity expansions dier with respect to the levels, the time patterns, and the equi-
librium prices, respectively. Assuming that the degree of demand growth (the benefit of an externality)
decreases with increases in the previous period’s market capacity, the analysis provides several interesting
results. First, the competitive market capacity expansion is initially slower and smaller than the monopoly
market capacity expansion. However, it gradually becomes faster and larger in the long run. Because of
the externality, the competitive market capacity expansion is slow and inecient from the social view-
point. In contrast, the monopolist plans a profit structure in order to earn large profits from a large market
demand by sacrificing early profits. The monopolist has an incentive for a large amount of early market
cultivation by internalizing the externality. This leads to faster market capacity expansion than in the com-
petitive market. However, the monopolist slows down the rate of market cultivation to yield large profits
by restricting market capacity.
Second, the initially slow competitive market capacity expansion has an S-shaped time pattern that is
reported by a number of researchers who investigate the time patterns of a number of firms3 and products4.
In contrast, monopoly market capacity expansion has diculty in following the initial convex part of the
S-shaped time patterns. The intuitive logic for the dierence in the initial time patterns is as follows. In
the competitive market, the attractiveness of a new entry is determined by the strength of its externality
3See, for example, Gort and Klepper (1982) who investigate the time patterns of a number of firms in 46 product markets.
Note that S-shaped diusion is not an isolated phenomenon. Empirical evidence shows that the time patterns of the intra-firm and
inter-firm technology diusion processes also tend to be S-shaped: see the seminal work of Griliches (1957), Mansfield (1968),
and the survey of technological diusion by Stoneman (2002). For a discussion of the theoretical mechanism of adoption of new
technology, see Jensen (1982) and Rengnum (1981).
4S-shaped product diusion is treated as a stylized fact in the marketing literature. It is observed in a number of markets such
as color televisions (Karshenas and Stoneman (1992)), fax machines (Economides (1995)), and clothes dryers (Krishnan, Bass,
and Jain (1999)). This phenomenon is also observed in the services market in the presence of network externalities such as the
mobile telecommunications services market and the Digital Subscriber Line services market.
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eect. A strong externality eect makes a current period entry more profitable than in the previous period
and it raises the attractiveness of the new entry. This leads to the initial convex part of the S-shaped time
pattern. On the other hand, a strong externality eect also raises the monopolist’s benefit of internalizing
the externality. This provides the monopolist with a strong incentive for a large amount of early market
cultivation in order to generate a large amount of demand sooner. Therefore, the initial market capacity
expansion by the monopolist is less likely to increase, but more likely to maintain, the concave time
patterns.
Finally, the two market capacity expansions also dier with respect to the equilibrium prices. Whereas
the competitive equilibrium price is constant over time, the monopolist has an incentive to initially oer a
low introductory price5. The initial low introductory price contributes to the large amount of early market
cultivation by the monopolist. The eventual high price induces the monopolist to generate large profits
with the larger demand.
This paper is related to a number of literatures. First, this paper is most relevant to the industrial
organization literature concerned with market capacity expansion in the presence of intertemporal ex-
ternalities. The majority of previous studies on market capacity expansion are related to firm learning:
learning by doing (Jovanovic and Lach (1989)), learning consumer demand (Rob (1991)), and two sided
learning between consumers and firms (Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1997) and Vettas (1998)). S-shaped
diusion has been explained in these literatures. In contrast, this paper does not focus on the role of firm
learning, but focuses on the role of the consumption externality.
In the literature on firm learning, Vettas (2000) analyzes market capacity expansion with an intertem-
poral consumption externality. He shows that the competitive diusion path becomes S-shaped and that it
is always slower than the optimal path by a planner or a monopolist. In his model, however, the benefits
of market concentration are overestimated because the monopolist does not have an incentive to restrict
output because of perfectly elastic demand: the demand curve is a horizontal straight line. In addition,
the perfectly elastic demand induces his model to require firm learning for gradual market diusion6 and
5A number of studies state that introductory pricing is possible when network externalities exist (Rohlfs (1974), Katz and
Shapiro (1985, 1986), and Cabral, Salant, and Woroch (1999)). In addition, an introductory price has been theoretically observed
in the optimal pricing of experience goods (Schmalensee (1982), Shapiro (1983), and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006)) and to
gradually raise prices. In the marketing literature, Krishnan, Bass, and Jain (1999) analyze the optimal pricing strategy for new
products based on the Bass model and show the role of introductory pricing.
6If firm learning does not exist, market capacity expansion becomes instantaneous. The structure of firm learning in his model
builds on Rob (1991).
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develops an unnatural relation between market capacity and prices: while monopoly market capacity is
larger than for the competitive case, monopoly price is always higher7. In contrast, the demand here has
a more common structure: the demand curve is a downward sloping line and leads to gradual diusion
without firm learning, the inecient properties of monopoly diusion, and the natural relation between
the price and the market capacity.
Furthermore, this paper is related to the literature concerned with consumption externalities. One of
the established literatures concerned with intertemporal consumption externalities is rational addiction
where a consumer’s utility is positively related to the volume of own past consumption (see Becker and
Murphy (1988)). Frank (1989) studies an intertemporal eect where consumers’ own past experience
aects present consumption from a perspective of relative consumption. While these literatures do not
focus on the role of social learning on a consumer’s preferences, social learning also leads to intertemporal
consumption externalities (see Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandai, Hirsheifer, and Welch (1992), Ellison and
Fundenberg (1993), and MacFadden and Train (1996)). Becker (1991) studies restraint pricing where
consumer demand is positively related to market capacity, and Caminal and Vives (1996) analyze the
importance of past market share as a signal of product quality8. The model in this paper builds on these
points of view9. Assuming the existence of an intertemporal consumption externality, this paper explores
how it aects market capacity expansion depending on market concentration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 introduces
the concept of competitive equilibrium and analyzes its properties: the existence of S-shaped diusion.
Section 4 sets up the social planner problem and shows that competitive market capacity expansion is
slow from the social viewpoint. Section 5 sets up the monopoly problem and compares the competitive
market capacity expansion with the monopoly case. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. The proofs
of all results are provided in the Appendix.
7In contrast to our model, an increase in current market capacity does not lower market price, but raises future prices in the
case of perfectly elastic demand. In addition, as stated by Rob (1991), monopoly market capacity is always larger than in the
competitive case because of the informational externality generated by the firm’s learning. Therefore, a larger monopoly capacity
leads to higher market prices.
8See also Doganoglu (2003) who examines dynamic price competition in a horizontally dierentiated duopoly market.
9In the marketing literature, the modeling of S-shaped product diusion relies largely on so-called “epidemic” models estab-
lished by Bass (1969). See Mahajan, Muller and Bass (1990, 1995). In such models, information of a new product is assumed
to spread from users to nonusers by personal contact. This social interaction may provide an explanation of intertemporal con-
sumption externalities in this analysis. Therefore, this paper may be regarded as a complementary economic analysis of this
marketing literature.
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2 Model
This section develops the model. We characterize the consumers’ behavior in 2.1 and the firms’ behavior
in the competitive market in 2.2. We assume that time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. It is also
assumed that the market in this paper is a perishable good market or a services market in which the
service fee is charged in every period.
2.1 Consumers
There are a number of mass unit consumers for all periods. Each consumer has a dierent preference for
a product. Let  be the type of consumer, which is stationary for all periods and is uniformly distributed
on the interval [0,1]. The market capacity, the number of consumers who purchase the product, at period
t is denoted by qt. The consumers’ willingness to pay depends on the previous period’s market capacity
because of the intertemporal consumption externality. We assume the following reservation price for type
 consumer at periods t = 1; 2; ::, vt():
Assumption 1.
vt() = V(; qt 1) =  + (qt 1) (1)
where  > 0, 0(q) > 0, 00(q) < 0, (0) = 0, limq!0 0(q) = 1, and limq!1 0(q) = 0, and where  is a
preference parameter.
(qt 1) represents the intertemporal consumption externality, which has two properties. First, 0(qt 1)
> 0 implies that each consumer’s reservation price at period t is strictly increasing in the previous period’s
market capacity. Second, 00(qt 1) < 0 implies that the increase in the reservation price, or equivalently
the benefit of the externality, is strictly decreasing in the previous period’s market capacity. Of course,
there may exist a locally increasing part especially at smaller market capacities but it is unrealistic that the
increasing part would be observed for larger market capacities. This assumption guarantees that there is a
unique upper limit for market capacity for every market capacity expansion in this analysis10.
A consumer of type  pays pt for a product and enjoys consumer surplus of vt()   pt. The consumer
is assumed to purchase the product if and only if consumer surplus is nonnegative, i.e., vt()   pt  0.
10If the benefit of the externality increases initially, but eventually decreases with increases in the previous period’s market
capacity, multiple steady states may exist.
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Then, the inverse demand function at period t, P(qt 1; qt), becomes:
P(qt 1; qt) =
8>><>>: + (qt 1)   qt 0  qt  1;0 qt > 1: (2)
for all t = 1; 2;.., and 0  qt 1  1. It is easy to see that the inverse demand function is strictly increasing
in the previous period’s market capacity, but strictly decreasing in the current period’s market capacity.
2.2 Firms under Competitive Environment
Firms in the competitive market are identical, small and price takers. At the beginning of each period,
the set of firms is composed of two subsets associated with potential entrants and incumbents. There is
assumed to be no asymmetry of information between the two subsets and to be no demand uncertainty. At
the beginning of each period, potential entrants decide whether to enter the market or not, and incumbents
decide whether to exit the market or not. Potential entrants enter the market with entry cost c > 0, which
is the initial investment in purchases such as machines. We assume that machines are durable and are
operated for multiple periods. Machines can be operated at any level between zero to one unit for each
period in an environment of constant return to scale. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the scrap
value of machines is zero and the marginal cost is zero.
Let xt be the number of incumbents at period t, yt the number of new firms entering the market at the
beginning of period t. Because the entry cost is not recoverable and the marginal cost is zero, incumbents
do not have an incentive to exit the market. Therefore, yt = xt   xt 1  0 for all t = 1; 2;... Assuming that
x0 = 0, we have xt =
Pt
=1 y. Let i > 0 be a constant interest rate and the discount factor is denoted by
  1=(1 + i). For each period, firms maximize the discounted sum of future operation profits, which is
denoted by R(xt 1; yt)11, i.e.:
R(xt 1; yt) = pt + R(xt; yt+1); (3)
for all t = 1; 2;,.., where pt represents the direct operation profit (market price) at period t and R(xt; yt+1)
represents the discounted future operation profits. Potential entrants enter the market if and only if the
present value of net profits is positive, i.e., R(xt 1; yt) > c. If the demand is initially low and the fixed
cost or the discount factor is high, then entry may not occur in the first period. The following assumption
guarantees first period entry.
11Because entrants and incumbents are symmetric and the horizon is finite, they have the same present value of their future
revenue streams.
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Assumption 2.
 > (1   )c (4)
Assumption 2 implies that entering the market is profitable in the first period. If   (1 )c, then first
period entry is not attractive and it does not occur. Because this condition holds for all following periods,
the market capacity expansion never occurs.
3 Analysis
This section provides the characterization of competitive equilibrium and explores the existence of S-
shaped market diusion. We first characterize the competitive equilibrium in 3.1. Then, the existence of
S-shaped market diusion is examined.
3.1 Competitive Equilibrium
Each period’s equilibrium condition is determined by the market clearing condition and the zero profit
condition. Let rt be the number of new consumers who purchase the product at period t. Now, we define
the competitive equilibrium as follows:
Definition. The competitive equilibrium consists of three sequences fpct ; rct ; yct g that simultaneously satisfy
the following conditions:
1. The market clears for all t = 1; 2,...
rct = y
c
t (, qct = xct ): (5)
2. The market price is determined by the inverse demand of consumers for all t = 1; 2,...
pct = P(xct 1; xct 1 + yct ): (6)
3. New entry occurs until excess profits become zero for all t = 1; 2,...
R(xct 1; yct )  c; (7)
with equality if yct > 0.
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According to the above definition, the properties of the competitive market capacity expansion are
identified. From the market clearing condition, the number of new consumers, rct is nondecreasing. In
addition, from the zero profit condition and equation (3), the equilibrium price in the competitive market
becomes:
pct = (1   )c; (8)
for all t  1 such that yct > 0. This implies that the equilibrium price is constant as long as the market is
in the transition process and it does not depend on the externality. Given this equilibrium price, potential
entrants enter the market in response to demand growth in each period. By putting the inverse demand
function into equation (8), the competitive market capacity expansion is summarized as follows:
 + (xct 1)   [xct 1 + yct ] + c = c (9)
for all t  1 such that yct > 0. Equation (9) implies that the competitive market capacity expansion is
represented by a first order dierence equation with respect to xct . Denote the steady state of equation (9)
by xc. Then, the dynamical system of equation (9) is summarized in Figure 1. It is easy to see that the
sequences fxct g10 satisfy xct 2 [0; xc] for all t = 1; 2,.., and monotonicity, xc0 = 0 and xct ! xc as t ! 112.
3.2 S-shaped Market Diusion
From now on, we examine the time pattern of the competitive market capacity expansion and show that it
becomes S-shaped (initially convex, but eventually concave) when the externality eect is initially strong
enough. In terms of firm entry, S-shaped market diusion implies that the level of new entry is initially
increasing, but eventually decreasing. We first explore the determinants of the amount of new entry at each
period. Then, the initial convexity and the eventual concavity of the market diusion path are examined,
respectively.
Let yct  yct+1   yct . The time path of the market capacity expansion becomes S-shaped if yct > 0
initially, but yct < 0 eventually. We also define the potential firms’ profitability of entry at the beginning
12By rearranging the terms of equation (9), we have:
xct = X(xct 1) = (xct 1)= + [   (1   )c]=: (90)
From the properties of , we have X(0) = [   (1   )c]= > 0, X0(xct 1) > 0, X00(xct 1) < 0, limxct 1!0 X0(xct 1) = 1, and
limxct 1!1 X
0(xct 1) = 0. Therefore, X(xct 1) crosses the xct = xct 1 line only once and there is a unique steady state, xc.
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Figure 1: The dynamical system of competitive diusion path
of each period as (xct 1)  R(xct 1; 0)   c, i.e.:
(xct 1) =  + (xct 1)   xct 1   (1   )c; (10)
for all t = 1; 2;... Equation (10) implies that the net profit of new entry at the beginning of each period is a
function of the previous market capacity. It does not depend on the current period’s market capacity. Let
ct  ct+1   ct . The following lemma shows the relation between the profitability of new entry and the
level of new entry at each period.
Lemma 1. Suppose that xc0 = 0, and (1)  (1   )c so that xc  1. Then, for all t = 1; 2; ::, yct R 0 if
and only is ct R 0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 1 implies that an increase or decrease in the amount of new entry is equivalent to an increase
or decrease in the profitability of entering the market at the beginning of each period. If the profitability
increases (decreases), then the amount of new entry increases (decreases). Therefore, we focus on the
properties of (xct 1) more precisely in order to explore the time pattern of competitive market capacity
expansion. The following lemma summarizes the properties of the profitability of new entry:
Lemma 2. (xct 1) has a single peaked property; more precisely,
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1. (x) satisfies (x) > 0 for 0  x < xc, (0) =    (1   )c, and (xc) = 0.
2. There is a unique maximizer x¯ = 0 1() 2 (0; xc) such that (x¯) = ¯ >    (1   )c.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The single peaked property of the profitability of new entry is summarized in Figure 2. This property
follows from the features of the inverse demand function with yct = 0, P(xct 1; xct 1) =  + (xct 1)   xct 1.
An increase in the previous period’s market capacity leads to two independent eects associated with the
eect of demand growth because of the externality (as captured by (x)) and with the eect of declining
market price because of the downward sloping demand curve (as captured by x). First, market demand is
increasing in the previous period’s market capacity because of the intertemporal consumption externality.
The eect of demand growth on the profitability of new entry is always positive. However, the downward
sloping demand curve leads to a decline in the market price as the previous period’s market capacity
increases. This eect is always negative and it reduces the profitability of new entry. Therefore, the net
eect on the profitability of new entry is dependant on the relative magnitude of the two eects.
From the property of (), the eect of demand growth is initially stronger than that of a declining
market price, and the profitability of new entry is increasing for all 0  xct 1 < x¯. However, as the
market capacity increases, the eect of demand growth becomes weaker and the profitability of new entry
decreases for all xct 1 > x¯. Its value becomes zero at the steady state, x
c
. As a result, (xct 1) has the single
peaked property.
The single peaked property of the profitability of new entry and lemma 1 imply that the amount of
new entry increases for 0 < xct 1  x¯ but decreases for x¯ < xct 1 < xc. Because market capacity is strictly
increasing for all periods, it is easy to see that the time path of competitive market capacity expansion
eventually becomes concave. Therefore, it becomes S-shaped if 0 < xc1  x¯. This condition is equivalent
to 0(xc1) > . This implies that the strong externality eect contributes to the initial convexity of the time
path of competitive market capacity expansion. Moreover, the necessary and sucient condition for the
initial convexity is (xc1) > (xc0), where xc0 = 0. Let x be x > 0 such that (x) = (xc0). From Figure
2, it is easy to see that (xc1) > (xc0) if and only if xc1 < x. More precisely, we have the following
proposition:
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Proposition 1. Suppose that xc0 = 0. Then, the time pattern of competitive market capacity expansion
becomes S-shaped if and only if

 
   (1   )c

!
>    (1   )c: (11)
Proof. See Appendix. 
One of the important properties of the competitive capacity expansion is that the first period entry,
(  (1 )c)=, does not depend on the externality, (), but the subsequent period entry does. Therefore,
the strong externality eect does not lead to a larger market capacity expansion in the first period, but
it does in subsequent periods. From inequality (11) and the properties of (), it is easy to see that S-
shaped market diusion is more likely to be observed under small values of initial profitability, (xc0) =
  (1  )c, which follows from the low preference parameter, the low discount factor, and the high entry
cost. Therefore, we conclude that the S-shaped time pattern of competitive market capacity expansion is
observed for a strong externality eect and low initial profitability.
Figure 2: Property of ()
4 Welfare
In the previous section, we showed that the competitive market capacity expansion has an S-shaped time
pattern. We examine its welfare properties in this section and compare it with the monopoly market
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capacity expansion in the following section. We first set up a social planner problem in 4.1 and then
examine the properties of a socially optimal market capacity expansion in 4.2.
4.1 The Planner’s Problem
A social planner expands market capacity with expansion cost c per unit and zero marginal operation cost.
The planner maximizes the discounted sum of future welfare. Let xot be the market capacity set by the
planner at period t and yot the amount of new capacity expansion at period t. Socially optimal planning
satisfies the following Bellman Equation:
V(xot 1) = maxyot 0
(Z xot 1+yot
0
[ + (xot 1)   w   cyot ]dw + V(xot 1 + yot )
)
: (12)
The interpretation of the above equation is that the present value of the sum of future welfare is
current welfare plus the discounted next period value of the sum of future welfare. We now characterize
the feature of the social optimum market capacity expansion as follows:
Proposition 2. Let xo be the market size in the steady state of the social planner problem and  
[   00(xo)xo]=0(xo) > 0. Suppose that (1) + 0(1)  (1   )c (so that the Euler equation does not
jump), 2 > 4 (so that the eigenvalues are real numbers), and  > 1 +  (so that xo is saddle). Then,
there is a unique xo > 0, and for all t = 1; 2; ::, there exists a unique optimal solution of the planner’s
problem yot > 0, which satisfies the following conditions:
1. For all t = 1; 2; ::, the optimal solution yot satisfies the following second order dierence equation:
R(xot 1; yot ) + 0(xot 1 + yot )[xot 1 + yot + yot+1] = c; (13)
where R(xt 1; yt) =  + (xt 1)   [xt 1 + yt] + c, and
2. For all t = 1; 2; ::, xot 2 [0; xo] with xo0 = 0 and xot ! xo = 0 as t ! 1.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Note that there is a second order dierence equation, but one initial condition, xo0 = 0. Therefore,
another boundary condition is required. Proposition 2 shows that there exists a unique steady state xo
whose local property is saddle. It also shows that there exist unique sequences fxot g10 converging on
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xo, which is determined by two boundary conditions, and satisfies monotonicity and xot 2 [0; xo] for all
t = 1; 2; ::.
Equation (13) shows that the marginal expansion cost is equal to the marginal social benefit at the
socially optimal plan. The right hand side is the marginal expansion cost. The left hand side is the
marginal social benefit, which is composed of two elements. The first term represents the discounted sum
of future revenue. The second term indicates the social benefit from the internalization of the externality;
increased current sales increase the subsequent period’s market demand.
4.2 Optimal Capacity Expansion
Note that the only dierence between the competitive market capacity expansion and the socially optimal
market capacity expansion is whether to internalize the social benefit from the externality or not. From
the social viewpoint, it is more ecient to design a market capacity expansion taking into consideration
an increase in the subsequent period’s demand as a result of increased current sales. On this point, the
competitive market capacity expansion is socially inecient.
Let pot be the shadow price of the product in the planner’s problem. From equation (13), it is denoted
by:
pot = (1   )c   0(xot )xot+1 > 0; (14)
for all t  113. Note that the equilibrium price in the competitive market does not depend on the strength
of the externality eect and it is constant for all periods, i.e., pct = (1   )c for all t = 1; 2; ::. On the
other hand, the shadow price in the planner’s planning depends on the strength of the externality eect
and changes responding to the strength of the externality eect. It is easy to see that it is lower than the
equilibrium price in the competitive market. This property leads to the socially ecient market capacity
expansion, which is faster than the competitive one:
Proposition 3. Suppose that xi0 = 0, for all i = c; o and  2 (0; 1]. Then, for all xct 1  xot 1, we have
xct < x
o
t .
Proof. See Appendix. 
13The last inequality follows from the assumption (1) + 0(1)  (1   )c.
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Moreover, the two market capacity expansions dier according to their time patterns. Whereas the
externality does not aect the first period’s market capacity expansion in the competitive market, it does
under socially optimal planning. The strong externality eect makes the competitive market capacity
expansion initially too slow from the social viewpoint and initially convex. On the other hand, it leads
to an initially large market capacity under optimal planning and makes the S-shaped time pattern more
dicult to obtain.
5 Comparing Competitive Diusion and Monopoly Diusion
In this section, we examine how the market capacity expansion diers depending on the degree of market
concentration. We first set up the monopoly market capacity expansion in 5.1. Then, we compare it with
the competitive one in 5.2.
5.1 The Monopolist’s Planning
A monopolist is assumed to expand market capacity with expansion cost c per unit and the zero marginal
operation costs. The monopolist maximizes the discounted sum of future profits. Let xmt be the market
capacity by the monopolist at period t and ymt the amount of new capacity expansion at period t. The profit
maximization problem is summarized by the following Bellman equation:
V(xmt 1) = maxymt 0
n
 + (xmt 1)   [xmt 1 + ymt ]   cymt + V(xmt 1 + ymt )
o
: (15)
The interpretation of the above equation is that the present value of the sum of future profits is composed
of the current profit and the discounted next period profit. The following proposition characterizes the
monopolist’s planning.
Proposition 4. Let xm be the market size in the steady state under the monopolist’s plan and  = [2  
00(xm)xm]=0(xo) > 0. Suppose that (1) + 0(1)   + (1   )c, and 2 > 4. Then, there exists a
unique xm > 0 and for all t = 1; 2; ::, there exists a unique ymt > 0, which satisfies the following conditions:
1. For all t = 1; 2; ::, the optimal solution ymt > 0 satisfies the following second order dierence
equation:
R(xmt 1; ymt ) + 0(xmt 1 + ymt )[xmt 1 + ymt + ymt+1]   [xmt 1 + ymt ] = c: (16)
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2. For all t = 1; 2; ::, xmt 2 [0; xm] with xm0 = 0 and xmt ! xm as t ! 1.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Equation (16) implies that the marginal expansion cost for the monopolist is equal to the marginal
benefit, which is composed of three elements. The first term on the right hand side of equation (16) is the
present value of the sum of direct future revenues. The second term is the discounted value of the future
benefit in which an increased current market capacity raises subsequent period demand. The last term
represents a marginal loss of current revenue. This term is regarded as the current benefit, in which the
decreased current market capacity raises the current revenue.
The last two terms represent the intertemporal trade owith respect to the market cultivation strategies
of the monopolist. From the discounted future benefit, the monopolist has an incentive to lower the current
market price and increase current market capacity. This incentive coincides with the social planner’s
incentive to maximize social welfare. However, the monopolist has the incentive to raise the current
market price and to reduce output because of the current benefit. Therefore, the optimal planning by the
monopolist is determined by the magnitude of both benefits.
5.2 Initial Eciency and Eventual Ineciency of Monopoly Diusion
The comparison of both market capacity expansions starts from the initial market capacity expansions.
Then, the eventual market capacity expansions are examined. Note that the only dierence between both
market capacity expansions is that the monopolist faces an intertemporal trade o.
Let pmt be the monopoly equilibrium price at period t. It is denoted by:
pmt = (1   )c   0(xmt )xmt+1 + xmt ; (17)
for all t = 1; 2; ::. It is easy to see that the monopoly equilibrium price is endogenously determined by
the intertemporal trade o between the discounted future benefit and the current benefit. By comparing
(8) with (17), the monopoly equilibrium price at the current period is lower (higher) than the competitive
one if the net benefit of increasing current output is positive (negative). Because the inverse demand is
strictly decreasing in the current market capacity, the larger (smaller) monopoly capacity is observed as
long as the previous monopoly market capacity is at least as large (small) as the previous competitive
market capacity.
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Proposition 5. Suppose that xi0 = 0 for all i = c;m and 0(xmt )xmt+1 7 xmt . Then, for all xmt 1 Q xct 1, we
have xmt 7 xct .
Proof. See Appendix. 
Note that the higher value of the discounted future benefit arises in the environment of a strong exter-
nality eect, 0(xmt ), the large new market capacity expansion in the subsequent period, ymt+1, and the low
discount value, . On the other hand, the degree of the current benefit, xmt is constant under the current
market capacity. Therefore, we conclude that the monopoly market capacity is larger than the competitive
one in the early periods because the externality eect is decreasing over time and ymt+1 is initially large
14
.
Next, we compare the eventual capacity expansions in the both markets. As the market capacity in-
creases, the net benefit of increasing the current market capacity decreases and the monopoly equilibrium
price increases. The following lemma shows that the net benefit of increasing the current market capacity
becomes negative in the steady state.
Lemma 3. In the steady state,  > 0(xm).
Proof. See Appendix. 
From lemma 3, it is easy to see that the monopoly equilibrium price in the steady state is higher
than the competitive one by comparing equations (8) and (17). This implies that the monopolist has
an incentive to slow down the market cultivation and to eventually earn positive profits. The following
proposition shows that the slow downed monopoly market capacity expansion leads to a smaller market
size in the steady state than for the competitive market capacity expansion.
Proposition 6. In the steady state, xc > xm.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The characteristic monopoly equilibria15 may explain the low introductory price. In the presence of
the intertemporal consumption externality, it is optimal for the monopolist to reduce the initial profits
14Whereas the concavity of (x) contributes this result, this result holds even if the externality eect is constant, i.e., 0(x) =
¯ < . In this setting, the discounted sum of the future benefit in the first period is denoted by ¯[xm1 +ym2 ]. Because ym2 is positive,
the monopoly market capacity expansion is initially faster than the competitive one if    ¯ is close to zero.
15The results here dier from the results of Vettas (2000). The monopoly price in Vettas is dependent only on the previous
period’s market capacity because of perfectly elastic demand: an increase in the monopolist’s output does not lower price. In
the equilibrium, the large amount of market capacity in the previous period raises prices and revenues. In this environment, the
16
by using the introductory price, and to start to earn larger profits with higher demand and a higher price
in the earlier periods. If the externality eect is initially strong enough, the monopolist earns negative
profits in the initial periods, but soon obtains strong demand growth. It is interesting to recognize that the
monopolist’s incentive to cultivate the market initially leads to a socially more ecient output level than
the competitive market under a strong externality eect.
Furthermore, the above results provide some implications about the time pattern of the monopoly
market capacity expansion. As well as the socially optimal capacity expansion, the first period monopoly
market capacity expansion is influenced by the externality. In addition, it eventually leads to a smaller
market size than the competitive one. Therefore, the monopoly market capacity expansion in the first
period is relatively larger than the competitive one. It tends to be concave and has the greatest diculty
of the three market capacity expansions in becoming S-shaped.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a dynamic model of market capacity expansion where the market demand endoge-
nously shifts in response to the previous period’s market capacity because of an intertemporal consump-
tion externality. We explore how the degree of market diusion depends on the market structures with
respect to its levels, time patterns, and prices. The major results reported here are summarized as follows.
First, the competitive environment leads to a constant equilibrium price, which is not influenced by the
externality. This contributes to the S-shaped time pattern of market capacity expansion. In addition, the
competitive market capacity expansion is socially inecient and initially too slow because it does not
internalize the benefit of the externality through the market price. Therefore, subsidies for initial entrants
can be an eective policy.
On the other hand, market concentration enables the firm to control the market price by internalizing
the eect of the externality. The monopolist has an incentive to initially cultivate the market at a fast pace
using a low introductory price and eventually earn large profits with higher levels of demand. Whereas
this strategy leads to negative profits initially, it is optimal because the monopolist generates high levels
of market demand sooner.
monopolist has no incentive to restrict the current market capacity, but has an incentive to increase it instead. In addition, the
monopoly market capacity is ecient and larger than the competitive one because of firm learning. As a result, the monopoly
market capacity is ecient and larger than the competitive one, while the monopoly price is higher.
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Whereas the model has ignored the impact of heterogeneous firms, demand uncertainty, technological
progress, and strategic behavior, which mainly impact the producer, these elements may be important
issues for market diusion. However, our concern here is to examine how market diusion diers between
market structures when an intertemporal consumption externality exists, and to provide an alternative
explanation of S-shaped market diusion and a low introductory price as simply as possible without these
elements. Therefore, this paper is to be regarded as a complement to these issues.
There are the several issues requiring future work. First, the empirical importance of the intertemporal
consumption externality and the relation between market capacity expansion and market concentration.
In addition, this paper ignores the aspect of oligopolistic market diusion. My conjecture is that an
oligopolistic market capacity expansion is faster than the monopoly, but slower than the competitive mar-
ket, and that its time pattern is likely to be S-shaped as the number of firms increase. Finally, there is
concern over how general our results are. While the analysis here is couched in terms of a parametric
example, the results may extend to more general settings. We hope this study helps researchers address
these issues.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Note that for all t = 1; 2; ::, new entry yct > 0 satisfies ct = yct . It is straightforward that ct is positively
related to yct . 
Proof of Lemma 2
By dierentiating (x) with respect to x, we have,
0(x) = 0(x)   ; (18)
and
00(x) = 00(x): (19)
By the definition of (), (x) is a strictly concave function for x  0 and has a unique maximizer
x¯ = 0 1(). It is easy to see that (x¯) > (0) =    (1   )c and (xc) = 0. .
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Proof of Proposition 1
Because the competitive diusion path eventually becomes concave, it becomes S-shaped if and only if
c1 > 0. This condition is equivalent to:
(xc1) > xc1: (20)
Putting xc1 = [ + (1   )c] into this inequality and rearranging terms, we have inequality (11). 
Proof of Proposition 2
Note that there is a second order dierence equation and one initial condition, xo0 = 0. By using a phase
diagram, we show that there exist unique sequences, fxot g10 , which satisfy (i) for all t = 1; 2; ::, xot 2 [0; xo],
and (ii) monotonicity, xo0 = 0 and xot ! xo as t ! 1.
We first show that there exists a unique xo > 0. On the steady state,
xo   (xo)   0(xo)xo =    (1   )c: (21)
Let T (x) = x (x)  0(x). It is easy to see that T (x) is strictly increasing in x > 0 such that T (x) > 0.
Therefore, there exists a unique xo > 0.
To analyze the property of equation (13) further, we transform equation (13) into an equivalent system
in the (xot 1; xot ) space. Solving (13) with respect to xot+1, we have:
xot+1 =
1
0(xot )
fxot   (xot 1)   [   (1   )c]g; (22)
for all t = 1; 2; ::. Note that equation (22) is a second order dierence equation with one variable, xo. By
defining zot  xot 1, we translate equation (22) to a simultaneous equation with two variables, xo and zo.
Let the right hand side of equation (20) be (xot ; xot 1). Then, equation (20) becomes:8>><>>:xot+1 = (xot ; zot );zot+1 = xot : (23)
for all t = 1; 2; ::. By using Taylor’s formula, the linearized system around xo is denoted by:"
xot+1   xo
zot+1   xo
#
=
"
   1
1 0
# "
xot   xo
zot   xo
#
: (24)
for all t = 1; 2; ::. Then, the characteristic equation becomes:
(o)2   o + 1

= 0: (25)
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Assuming 2 > 4 and  > 1 + , we have eigenvalues o1; 
o
2 2 R2+ such that 0 < o1 < 1 < o2 and
eigenvector corresponding to o1 is:
(eo1; eo2) = (o1; 1): (26)
Therefore, the local property of xo is saddle.
We finally draw the phase diagram. From equation (23), zot = zot+1 locus is zot = xot , that is, the 45
degree line of the (zot ; xot ) plane. On the other hand, the xot = xot+1 locus is xot = (xot ; zot ). By solving
(xot ; zot ) with respect to zot , we have:
zot = 
 1([   0(xot )])xot   [   (1   )c]); (27)
for all t = 1; 2; ::. Because [   0(xot )]xot is strictly increasing in xot and convex for [   0(xot )]xot > 0,
and  1(x) is strictly increasing and convex, the xot = xot+1 locus is strictly increasing and convex in xot .
We next examine whether zot and xot are increasing or decreasing above and below the phase-lines. It is
easy to check that for the points above the zot = zot+1 line, we have z
o
t > z
o
t+1, and for the points below the
zot = z
o
t+1 line, we have z
o
t < z
o
t+1. Also, for the points above x
o
t = x
o
t+1 line, we have x
o
t > x
o
t+1, and for
the points below xot = xot+1, we have x
o
t < x
o
t+1. The phase diagram is summarized in Figure 3 where the
arrows show the direction of increase at each point.
We now characterize the optimal solution by using the above properties. It satisfies the following
conditions: (i) the xot = xot+1 locus is increasing and (ii) xot 2 [x¯o; xo] for all t = 1; 2; ::, where:
x¯o =

x 2 R++ : [   0(x)]x =    (1   )c	 : (28)
Because [   0(x)]x is strictly increasing in x for all [   0(x)]x > 0, there exists a unique x¯o > 0.
This implies that the xot = xot+1 locus intersects the x
o
t 1 = 0 axis once at x¯
o > 0. Any xot < [x¯o; xo] does not
become the optimal solution. Therefore, we conclude that the optimal solution that satisfies conditions
(i) and (ii) is restricted in the shaded portion. Any points outside the shaded portion diverge and do not
become the optimal solution. For the points above the zot = zot+1 locus, x
o
t becomes negative in finite
time but this violates a feasibility condition. On the other hand, for the points above zot+1 > z
o
t but below
xot = x
o
t+1, x
o
t is increasing over time satisfying zot+1 > z
o
t (xot > xot 1). However, for large xot such that
xot > x
o
t 1, the inverse demand function becomes P(xot 1; xot ) = 0. In these circumstances, Euler equation
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(13) does not hold. It is easy to see that there exists a unique path that converges to xo and the optimal
solution consists of the points that belong to the stable manifold of xo. 
Figure 3: The dynamical system of socially optimal diusion path
Proof of Proposition 3
Let U(xot 1; xot )   + (xot 1)   xot + 0(xot )xot+1. Rearranging equation (9), the competitive diusion
path is denoted by:
U(xct 1; xct )   0(xct )xct+1 = c: (29)
Let xct 1  xot 1. Suppose in negation that xct  xct . Then, by using the properties of U(; ), we have the
following inequalities:
U(xot 1; xot )  U(xot 1; xct )  U(xct 1; xct ); (30)
for all t = 1; 2; ::, where the first inequality follows from U2(xt 1; xt) < 0 and the second inequality
follows from U1(xt 1; xt) > 0. Because U(xot ; xot ) = c in the equilibrium, we have U(xct 1; xct )  c which
contradicts equation (29) because 0(xct )xct+1 is positive. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
Note that there is a second order dierence equation and one initial condition, xm0 = 0. By using a
phase diagram, we show that there exist unique sequences, fxmt g10 , which satisfy (i) for all t = 1; 2; ::,
xmt 2 [0; xm], and (ii) monotonicity, xm0 = 0 and xmt ! xm as t ! 1.
We first show that there exists a unique xm > 0. In the steady state,
2xm   (xm)   0(xm)xm =    (1   )c: (31)
Let F(x) = 2x (x) 0(x). It is easy to see that F(x) is strictly increasing in x > 0 such that F(x) > 0.
Therefore, there exists a unique xm > 0.
To analyze the properties of equation (16) further, we transform equation (16) to an equivalent system
in (xmt 1; xmt ) space. Solving (16) with respect to xmt+1, we have:
xmt+1 =
1
0(xmt )
f2xmt   (xmt 1)   [   (1   )c]g; (32)
for all t = 1; 2; ::. Note that equation (32) is a second order dierence equation with one variable, xm. By
defining zmt  xmt 1, we translate equation (32) to a set of simultaneous equations with two variables, xm
and zm. Let the right hand side of equation (32) be  (xmt ; xmt 1). Then, equation (32) becomes:8>><>>:xmt+1 =  (xmt ; zmt );zmt+1 = xmt : (33)
for all t = 1; 2; ::. By using Taylor’s formula, the linearized system around xm is denoted by:"
xmt+1   xm
zmt+1   xm
#
=
"
   1
1 0
# "
xmt   xm
zmt   xm
#
: (34)
for all t = 1; 2; ::. Then, the characteristic equation becomes:
(m)2   m + 1

= 0: (35)
Assuming 2 > 4, it is easy to check that  > 1 +  because  > 0(xm)16. Therefore, we have
eigenvalues m1 ; 
m
2 2 R2+ such that 0 < m1 < 1 < m2 and an eigenvector corresponding to m1 is:
(em1 ; em2 ) = (m1 ; 1): (36)
16This property is proved in Lemma 3.
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Therefore, the local property of xm is saddle.
We finally draw the phase diagram. From equation (33), the zmt = zmt+1 locus is zmt = xmt , that is, the 45
degree line of the (zmt ; xmt ) plane. On the other hand, the xmt = xmt+1 locus is xmt =  (xmt ; zmt ). By solving
 (xmt ; zmt ) with respect to zmt , we have:
zmt = 
 1([2   0(xmt )])xot   [2   (1   )c]); (37)
for all t = 1; 2; ::. Because [2 0(xmt )]xmt is strictly increasing in xmt and convex for [2 0(xmt )]xmt >
0, and  1(x) is strictly increasing and convex, the xmt = xmt+1 locus is strictly increasing and convex in
xmt . We next examine whether zmt and xmt are increasing or decreasing above and below the phase-lines.
It is easy to check that for the points above zmt = zmt+1 line, we have z
m
t > z
m
t+1, and for the points below
zmt = z
m
t+1, we have z
m
t < z
m
t+1. Also, for the points above x
m
t = x
m
t+1 line, we have x
m
t > x
m
t+1, and for the
points below xmt = xmt+1, we have x
m
t < x
m
t+1. The phase diagram is presented in Figure 4 where the arrows
show the direction of increase at each point.
We now characterize the optimal monopoly solution by using the above properties. It satisfies the
following conditions: (i) the xmt = xmt+1 locus is increasing and (ii) xmt 2 [x¯m; xm] for all t = 1; 2; ::, where:
x¯m =

x 2 R++ : [2   0(x)]x =    (1   )c	 : (38)
Because [2   0(x)]x is strictly increasing in x for all [2   0(x)]x > 0, there exists a unique x¯m > 0.
This implies that the xmt = xmt+1 locus intersects the x
m
t 1 = 0 axis at x¯
m > 0. Any xmt < [x¯m; xm] does not
become the optimal monopoly solution. Therefore, we conclude that the optimal monopoly solution that
satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) is restricted to the shaded portion. Any points outside the shaded portion
diverge and do not become the optimal monopoly solution. For the points above the zmt = zmt+1 locus,
xmt becomes negative in finite time, but this violates a feasibility condition. On the other hand, for the
points above zmt+1 > z
m
t , but below xmt = xmt+1, x
m
t is increasing over time satisfying zmt+1 > z
m
t (xmt > xmt 1).
However, for large xmt such that xmt > xmt 1, the inverse demand function becomes P(xmt 1; xmt ) = 0. In
these circumstances, Euler equation (16) does not hold. It is easy to see that there exists a unique path
that converges to xm and the optimal monopoly solution consists of the points that belong to the stable
manifold of xm. 
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Figure 4: The dynamical system of monopoly diusion path
Proof of Proposition 5
Let L(xct 1; xct )  R(xct 1; yct ). We prove the first case. Let 0(xmt )xmt+1 < xmt and xmt 1  xct 1. Suppose in
negation that xmt  xct . Then, using the property of L(; ), we have the following inequalities:
L(xct 1; xct )  L(xct 1; xmt )  L(xmt 1; xmt ); (39)
for all t  1 such that xmt 1  xct 1, where the first inequality follows from L2(xt 1; xt) < 0 and L1(xt 1; xt) >
0. Because L(xct 1; xct ) = c in the competitive equilibrium, we have L(xmt 1; xmt )  c. This is a contradiction
to equation (16) because 0(xmt )xmt+1 < xmt . In the same way, we can prove the second case. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose in negation that xm  0(xm). Then, we have the following inequalities:
xm  0(xm)xm < (xm); (40)
Where the last inequality follows from the property of (). These inequalities imply that:
2xm  (xm) + 0(xm)xm: (41)
This contradicts the steady state condition, 2xm > (xm) + 0(xm)xm. 
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Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose in negation that xc  xm. This implies that (xm)  0. But this contradicts the steady state
condition:
(xm) = xm   0(xm)xm > 0: (42)
Therefore, xc > xm. 
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